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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MRS. HERMAN FOSTER and 
JOHN EWING, natural parents 
of Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, 
aka Jeffrey Ewing Foster, 
Deceased, a minor, and 
DAVID MAC KELLY, 
Plaintiffs- Respondents, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 16608 
This is an action in contract based upon a Certificate of Self 
Insurance, and plaintiff's claim of recovery in this case is based upon 
the theory that automobile no-fault and automobile liability insurance 
policies are compulsory in the State of Utah, and that Salt Lake County 
is the primary liability insurance carrier for David Mac Kelly. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgmer. 
in the amount of $150, 000. 00, plus attorney's fees in the amount of 
$1. 015. 00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmation of the Summary Judgment entered 
by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to July 1, 197 7. Salt Lake County's motor vehicles were 
insured by commercial insurance companies, the most recent of which 
was the Gulf Insurance Company (hereinafter "Gulf") which provided 
Salt Lake County with both no-fault insurance coverage and comprehensi 
automobile liability insurance coverage. The no-fault limits of liabilit1 
were dictated by statute. The limits of liability of the Gulf comprehens:1i 
automobile insurance policy was $100, 000. 00 per person and $300,000.' 
I 
per occurrence for bodily injury, and $50, 000. 00 for each occurrence iii 
property damage. 
On June 13, 1977, the Salt Lake County Commission voted to 
investigate a self-insurance program. On June 27, 1977, Salt Lake 
County applied to the insurance commissioner for a Certificate of Sell 
Insurance. To provide security to pay outstanding judgment debts, Sal: 
-2-
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Lake County approved an annual levy of approximately $500, 000. oo. As 
further security for the payment of any claims incurred above the annual 
levy. Salt Lake County relied upon its powers under Utah Code Ann. 
§17-15-13 (1953) to levy an unlimited assessment to pay off any judgment 
incurred. On June 30, 1977, the Salt Lake County Commission decided to 
reject Gulf's bid to provide commercial insurance for a premium in the 
sum of $475. 000. 00, which resulted in a further savings for the County. 
The insurance commissioner approved Salt Lake County's application. 
and the Certiiicate of Self Insurance was issued on July 7, 1977. Conse-
quently, the commercial insurance was discontinued. 
On January 26, 1978, Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, aka Jeffrey Ewing 
Foster, the deceased son of Mrs. Herman Foster and Mr. John Ewing. 
was killed as a result of a motor vehicle/pedestrian accident which 
occurred at approximately 3900 South 900 East in Salt Lake County. Utah, 
at about 11 :00 p. m .• involving the decedent and an employee of Salt Lake 
i County, David Mac Kelly, a deputy sheriff who was driving a Sheriff's 
motor vehicle owned by Salt Lake County which had been issued to him. 
The motor vehicle had been furnished to David Mac Kelly by Salt Lake 
County for a 24-hour period, 7 days a week. 
Thereafter on March 9, 1978, David Mac Kelly was served as a 
named defendant in an action brought by the decedent's parents for the 
-3-
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wrongful death of their son. David Mac Kelly contacted the Farmer's I 
Insurance Group (hereinafter "Farmers"), the insurance carriers on rri: 
personal vehicle which had not been involved in the accident. In a Jette 
i 
I dated March 15, 1978, Farmer's Ross Marchant tendered the defendan: 
of the action to Salt Lake County as the self-insurer of the County mot0, 
I 
vehicle involved in the accident. Shortly thereafter, Paul VanDam, thE I 
County Attorney, acting in behalf of Salt Lake County as a self-insurer, 
declined the defense which had been tendered to him. Subsequently, 
Farmer's represented David Mac Kelly under a Reservation of Rights 
claiming that Salt Lake County, as a self-insurer of its own motor vehicj 
bad a primary duty to defend David Mac Kelly. On July 27, 1978, W. 
Brent Wilcox, acting as independent counsel for David Mac Kelly, agai~ 
tendered his defense to Salt Lake County, in a letter which reads in par 
as follows: 
We demand that you undertake defense and 
responsibility for any liability as assessed against 
Mr. Kelly on the grounds that Salt Lake County as 
the self-insurer of the automobile driven by Mr. 
Kelly, has a legal duty to defend Mr. Kelly and 
pay any and all judgments or settlements against 
him arising out of this action. 
The County Commission, having received the letter from W. Br'~ 
Wilcox, requested that Paul VanDam again review the matter and send' 
recommendation to them. w. Brent Wilcox never received a response 
10
1 
I 
-4- I 
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his tender. In short, Salt Lake County denied that it had an automobile 
liability policy to cover David Mac Kelly, and refused to defend him in the 
civil action or pay any judgment rendered against him therein. 
Thus, David Mac Kelly found himself placed in a very precarious 
situation. Salt Lake County was prosecuting him criminally. A civil 
complaint for wrongful death had been filed against him praying for damages 
of $1, 250, 000, 00. Further, the nature of the accident and the facts as 
developed in investigation subsequent to the accident indicate a trial 
would have a deep emotional impact upon the jury and probably result 
in a very large plaintiff's verdict. The father of the deceased, John 
Ewing, suffered from muscular dystrophy. The mother of the deceased, 
Mrs. Herman Foster, suffered from multiple sclerosis. The deceased was 
their only child. Moreover, Salt Lake County had declined to defend him 
in the lawsuit or pay any judgments that might be rendered against him; 
and Salt Lake County refused to recognize its serious conflict of interest. 
With Salt Lake County denying liability, David Mac Kelly proceeded 
to use all reasonable means of avoiding personal liability and on Decem-
ber 12, 1978, he entered into an agreement with Mrs. Herman Foster 
and John Ewing, parents and natural guardians of Jeffrey Adrian Ewing 
aka Jeffrey Ewing Foster, wherein the parties agreed that the plaintiffs 
could schedule a non-jury trial and that David Mac Kelly would submit 
-5-
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without further contest the issue of negligence and liability upon the 
depositions taken in the case, and upon the testimony of any other 
witnesses called by the plaintiffs, and that if the court found liability 
against David Mac Kelly for negligence, the amount of damages was to 
be determined by the court upon additional proof to be offered by the 
plaintiffs. Further, the plaintiffs agreed under certain circumstances: 
to proceed against any of the personal assets of David Mac Kelly other 
than the rights which Kelly had against Salt Lake County, or any other 
insurers affording liability coverage. 
On January 4, 1979, by order of the court and with the consem 
of all parties, Salt Lake County, Delmar L. Larson and Rex L. Vance 
were voluntarily dismissed from the wrongful death action. At all 
times material herein, Salt Lake County was fully represented by cour; 
who not only voluntarily withdrew from the case, but refused to defena 
or assist David Mac Kelly. 
On January 5, 1979, the wrongful death action by plaintiffs 
against David Mac Kelly was tried before the Honorable Judge Davidh 
Winder. The Judge was fully advised about and given copies of the 
Stipulation for Dismissal without prejudice as to defendants Delmar L. 
Larson, Rex L. Vance, and Salt Lake County, and the Stipulation 
entered into between the plaintiffs and David Mac Kelly. The trial 
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was not uncontested: The depositions of Utah Highway Patrolman D. N. 
Tinning, independent witness Dale V. Leany, defendant David Mac 
Kelly, Sheriff Delmar L. Larson and Sheriff Rex L. Vance were published 
and considered by the court in determining the issue of liability. In all 
of the above depositions except the deposition of Utah Highway Patrolman 
D. N. Tinning, counsel for David Mac Kelly appeared and actively cross-
examined the witnesses. In the case of Utah Highway Patrolman D. N. 
Tinning, various counsel for David Mac Kelly were properly notified and 
advised of the deposition, but failed to appear. Documentary evidence was 
also introduced and considered by the court. Frank Keith Stuart, a 
certified public accountant and financial consultant, Mrs. Herman 
Foster and Mr. John Ewing personally testified at the trial. Judge 
David K. Winder took the matter under advisement and subsequently 
ruled that David Mac Kelly while operating a motor vehicle assigned to 
him and owned by Salt Lake County was negligent and his negligence 
caused an automobile/pedestrian accident which resulted in the death 
of Jeffrey Adrian Ewing aka Jeffrey Ewing Foster. A judgment was 
awarded against David Mac Kelly in the sum of $150, 000. 00. 
On January 30, 1979, the plaintiffs filed an action against Salt 
Lake County claiming that Salt Lake County was the automobile liability 
insurer for David Mac Kelly and, as such, was indebted to the plaintiffs 
-7-
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in the sum of $100, 000. 00 and for such other and further relief as 
the court deemed proper. 
The case was set for a jury trial on June 28, 1979, but prior 
to trial, the Honorable Judge James S. Sawaya heard plaintiff's Motiol 
for Summary Judgment. He granted summary judgment against Salt 
Lake County in the amount of $150, 000. 00 because there were no mate: 
issues of fact and plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter oil<; 
Subsequent Motions to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence 
and to reduce the judgment were heard by the court on August 9, 1979, 
both Motions were denied on the basis that the court lacked jurisdictio: 
a Notice of Appeal having already been filed. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I 
THAT AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT AND AUTOMOBILE 
LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGES ARE COM-
PULSORY IN UTAH. 
The defendant claims that the extent of Salt Lake County's liabL 
as a "self-insurer" is limited to payment of "no-fault" benefits. Ther,, 
are some states with laws requiring compulsory no-fault coverage onJ\, 
namely: Florida, Texas, Arkansas, and South Dakota. However, thi: 
is not the law in Utah. 
In Utah, both automobile liability insurance and no-fault insurzc 
coverages are compulsory. States with similar no-fault statues reqw' 
-8-
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both coverages are: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachussets, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, North Dakota and Michigan. 
See: Automobile Liability Insurance, No-Fault Insurance, Ervin 
Schermer, Vol. 1, §1. 02, Automobile Liability and §§8.12, 8123, 
No-Fault (1979), 
The point is the Legislature could have adopted a program as 
defendant suggests, but it expressly elected not to. as did the majority 
of states for obvious public policy reasons. 
Prior to the enactment of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act in 1973, public entities were not required to carry public liability 
insurance according to Utah Code Ann. §41-12-33 (1953 as amended) 
In 1973, however, the Legislature adopted the Utah Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act, Utah Code Ann. §31-41-1, et seq., (1953 as amended) 
which changed the law. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-4(3) (1953 
as amended) provided that: 
The State of Utah and all its political subdivisions 
and their respective departments. institutions 
or agencies shall maintain in effect continuously 
in respect to their motor vehicles the security 
provided for in §31-41-5. [Emphasis added] 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann., §31-41-5 (1953 as amended) 
provided two alternative methods whereby the required security can be 
-9-
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provided. Subsection (a) authorizes security to be provided through ar. 
automobile insurance policy which qualifies under the Safety Responsit_ 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §41-12-1, et seq. (1953 as amended). Subsec-
tion (b) permits security to be provided by any other method approved: 
the Insurance Department as affording equivalent security to that offer' 
by a commercial policy of insurance. 
So, the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act by specific 
reference requires liability insurance, or its equivalent, as required 
by the Utah Safety Responsibility Act. 
The Utah Safety Responsibility Act, specifically Utah Code Ann. 
§41-12-5 (1953 as amended) requires that every resident owner of a 
motor vehicle maintain certain security for the vehicle during the per!: 
of its registration. 
Furthermore. Utah Code Ann. §31-41-9 (1953 as amended) W 
vides in part that: 
The owner of a motor vehicle with respect to its 
security as required by this act who fails to have 
such security in effect at the time of an accident 
shall have no immunity from tort liability. 
From the beginning, the defendant has failed to recognize that 
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act incorporates by referenc< 
the liability provisions of the Utah Safety Responsibility Act and rnake5 
the liability provisions applicable to Salt Lake County. This, in lighti 
-10-
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the fact that Salt Lake County apparently knew and understood this new 
responsibility because prior to July 1, 1977 • Salt Lake County's motor 
vehicles were insured with a commercial insurance company, Gulf, which 
provided a comprehensive no-fault and automobile liability policy in 
compliance with both Acts. 
On July 7, 1977, when Salt Lake County complied with Utah 
Code Ann. §31-41-5(b) (1953 as amended) and was issued a Certificate 
of Self- Insurance, that it had obtained security at least equivalent to 
that provided Salt Lake CountybyGulf; namely automobile liability 
insurance limits of $100, 000. 00/$300, 000. 00 for bodily injury and 
$50, 000, 00 for property damages. The Certificate of Self-Insurance 
incorporated by reference the liability requirements of the Utah Safety 
Responsibility Act. Under a Certificate of Self-Insurance, as under a 
commercial insurance policy, the liability insurer has both the duty to 
defend an insured and the duty to pay any judgment entered against him. 
If the court finds that Salt Lake County did not provide liability 
automobile coverage, then the No-Fault Act says it has no immunity for 
liability and it would be liable for the judgment in any event. 
POINT II 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, AS AN INSURER, IS 
BOUND BY THE JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DAVID MAC KELLY. 
-11-
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It is a well accepted and general rule that where an insurer, 
whose insurance policy requires it to defend the insured, receives non 
of a suit and is allowed an opportunity to defend, but refuses, it is 
bound by the findings and judgment, absent a showing of collusion or 
fraud. See: McCarty v. Parks, 564 P. 2d 1122 (Utah 1977); ~ 
Fields, 259 P. 2d 639 (Wash. 1953); Warren Petroleum Corp. v. J,\I', 
Green Contractors, 417 F. 2d 242 (5th Cir. 1969); Coblentz v. Americ 
Surety Co. of New York, 416 F. 2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1969); Metcalfv. 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co •• 126 N. W. 2d 471 (Neb. 1964);a[ 
Taylor v. Safeco Ins. Co., 361 S. 2d 743 (Fla. App. 1978). 
Salt Lake County feels that it was duped, in spite of the fact 
that it was tendered the defense of David Mac Kelly on several differer 
occasions, because of its voluntary dismissal and the Stipulation belt: 
David Mac Kelly and plaintiffs. Defendant claims that the judgmentotJ 
against David Mac Kelly was a result of a secret agreement and no de'; 
i.e., collusion and fraud. Although this is a case of first impression 
here, similar fact situations have come before other courts. In~ 
v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 126 N. W. 2d 471 (Neb. 196!i, 
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that a consent judgment between plai'. 
tiff and defendant and an agreement of the plaintiff not to look to the 
defendant's personal assets but insurance proceeds to satisfy the jud['. 
-12-
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did not constitute collusion or fraud. In that case, Hartford Accident 
and Indemnity Company was the insurance carrier for the city sanitary 
extermination company. Its policy of insurance covered a 1958 Chevrolet 
station wagon belonging to the insured. On February 10, 1961, the station 
wagon, while driven by Robert A. Holder was involved in an accident 
with William N. Metcalf. Metcalf subsequently commenced an action 
against Robert A. Holder for personal injury and property damages. 
Demand was made upon the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company to 
defend the action, which was refused. Accordingly, Robert A. Holder 
employed independent counsel who defended the action. During the 
course of the trial, the parties agreed upon a judgment in the amount of 
$4, 500, 00 and costs in the amount of $37. 05 which was duly entered. 
Then, William N. Metcalf commenced an action against the Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Company to collect the judgment. 
With regard to the question of the settlement agreement and 
the question of collusion or fraud, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated: 
The defendant is obligated under its insurance 
policy to defend the suit brought against Holder, 
and additional insured. This it refuses to do. 
Holder was thereupon required to engage an 
attorney and provide his own defense. With 
the insurance company denying liability, 
Holder was entitled to use all reasonable means 
of a voiding personal liability. It was to his 
personal interest to consent to the $4, 500. 00 
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judgment and accept an agreement from 
the plaintiff not to execute on his property 
other than any rights to indemnity he might 
have in the designated insurance policies. 
The matter is of no consequence to defendant 
if its claim of non-liability is correct. 
Since its claim of non-liability has no validity, 
and it having declined to defend the action 
when called upon to do so, the defendant is 
in no position to attack the judgment in the 
absence of fraud, collusion, or bad faith •• 
Fraud or collusion in the obtaining of the judg-
ment against Holder was not pleaded nor proven 
in the instant case. Defendant asserts the 
unreasonableness of the judgment awarded 
plaintiff against Holder. Assuming that the 
unreasonableness of such a judgment bears 
upon the question of fraud or collusion, we 
point out that this case was tried to the court 
and that the judgment of the court has the 
effect of a jury verdict. There was evidence 
in the record that the judgment was reasonable 
and within the range of possible jury verdict. 
The trial court's judgment was supported by 
evidence and, it not being clearly wrong, no 
basis exists for any interference by this court 
with the judgment entered. At 476. [Emphasis 
added] 
The case of Metcalf v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., iJ 
was cited with approval in the case Coblentz v. American Surety C£E! 
of New York, 416 F. 2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1969). In the latter case, Ral~ 
Coblentz filed a wrongful death action against Vincent Carbone arisin! 
of the shooting death of his son. Carbone's insurer, American Sure~ 
Company of New York, defended the action unsuccessfully and judgmei' 
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totaling $70, 000. 00 were entered. Subsequently, the judgments were 
reversed and Amended Complaints were filed. American Surety 
Company of New York filed Answers to the Amended Complaints, but 
subsequently concluded that it was not obligated to defend Carbone and 
withdrew from his defense. Carbone retained other counsel and there-
after a waiver of jury trial was entered into together with a Stipulation 
of Facts and Testimony signed by counsel for both parties. On the 
basis of these Stipulations, the court entered judgments for Coblentz 
totaling $50, 000. 00. Even though the judgment was based upon the 
stipulation of testimony between the parties, both of whom strongly pre-
ferred a finding of negligence rather than intentional tort, the court 
held that the judgment was not tainted by fraud or collusion. Specifically, 
the court stated: 
The record shows that Carbone's lawyer advised 
American Surety that he intended to pursue the 
procedure approved by the Nebraska court in 
Metcalf, unless American Surety should choose 
to fulfill its obligation to defend Carbone. 
Having elected to leave Carbone to his own 
defense, American Surety could not later 
complain about the form of the judgment. 
"It is a well-settled principle that where 
a person is responsible over to another, 
either by operation of law or express con-
tract, and he is duly notified of the pendency 
of the suit against to whom he is liable over, 
and full opportunity is afforded him to defend 
the action, the judgment, if obtained without 
fraud or collusion, will be conclusive against 
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him, whether he appeared or not." 27 Am. 
Jur. Indemnity, §34, P. 478. See also 42 
C. J. S. Indemnity §32, P. 613; 50 C. J. S. 
Judgment, §811, P. 360. 
The judgment on which this garnishment 
action was based was not tainted by fraud 
or collusion. and American Surety was given 
notice of the procedure that Carbone intended 
to pursue. At 1063 [Emphasis added] 
Finally. in the case of Taylor v. Safeco Ins. Co., 361 S. 2d 74i 
(Fla. App. 1978), the District Court of Appeals of Florida, First Dis::. 
held as follows: 
We are aware that many authorities speak of 
the insured's privilege to effect a reasonable 
settlement, payable by the insurer, upon a 
finding that insurance existed, as arising upon 
the insurer's unjustified refusal to defend. 
Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Mattox, 173 So. 2d 
754, 758 (Fla. 1 St. D.C.A. 1965); Cunningham 
v. Austin Ford, Inc., 189 So. 2d 661, 666 (Fla. 
3D D. C. A. 1966); Phoenix Assur. Co. of New 
York v. Henry Corp., 267 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla. 
2D D. C. A. 1972); Appleman, Insurance Law & 
Practice, §4690 (1962 Supp. 1974); Annot. 
49 A. L. R. 2d 694, 743 et seq. (1956). 
For the reasons stated above, we conceive that 
insurer's potential obligation to pay also subsists 
when, as a result of the parties' failure to agree 
upon a conditional defense, the putitive insured 
chooses to control the litigation and to effect a 
reasonable settlement. 
In this case, Salt Lake County, as David Mac Kelly's insurer, 
was tendered the defense in a letter dated March 15, 1978, writtenb:-
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Ross Marchant of the Farmer's Insurance Group; on July 27, 1978, in 
a letter written by W. Brent Wilcox, David Mac Kelly's independent 
counsel; and orally on several other occasions. By refusing that tender 
of defense, Salt Lake County is bound by the judgment and findings entered 
by the court. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF SALT LAKE COUNTY WERE ABLE 
TO PROVE THE FACTS CLAIMED, IT WOULD 
NOT BE ENTITLED TO RECOVER BECAUSE 
IT COULD NOT SHOW FRAUD OR COLLUSION 
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
Once a judgment has been entered by a court of general juris-
diction, a presumption of regularity attaches to it which forces the 
attacking party to overcome it by affirmative proof to the contrary. 
See: Carnahan v. Carnahan, 79 Ariz. 371, 290 P. 2d 729 (1955); Gagnon 
Co. v. Nevada Desert Inn, 45 C. 2d 448, 289 P. 2d 466 (1955); Hartenbower 
v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co •• 67 Idaho 254, 175 P. 2d 698 (1946); and 
Mcintosh v. V&L Inv. Co., 196 Okl. 24, 162P.2d176 (1945). 
Defendant alleges that because of the voluntary dismissal and 
because of the stipulated agreement between plaintiffs and David Mac 
Kelly, the judgment against the latter is unenforceable as a result of 
fraud, collusion and bad faith. 
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The California Court of Appeals in Corcoran v. City of Los 
Angeles, 153 C. A. 2d 852, 315 P. 2d 439 (1957) held that the presumpni 
is always against fraud, and there must be substance in a charge of rr,_ 
and not just vague and equivocal generalities and conclusions based on. 
jecture and suspicion. We agree. 
In fact, to review the circumstances surrounding the judgment,. 
evident it was not the paper sham defendant claims it to be, but a judge' 
based upon considerable evidence with all of the parties concerned rep:· 
sented by competent counsel, Moreover, the "secret" agreement 11·as 
presented to the court for its review at the beginning of the trial. Salt 
Lake County could have defended Kelly, but it chose not to. To lampor,. 
the judgment is to impune the integrity of Judge David K. Winder. The 
trial was not uncontested: The depositions of Utah Highway Patrolman 
D. N. Tinning, independent witness Dale V. Leany, defendant David ~L 
Kelly, Sheriff Delmar L. Larson and Sheriff Rex L. Vance were publi: 
and considered by the court in determining the issue of liability. In al 
of the above depositions, except the deposition of Utah Highway Patroli: 
D. N. Tinning, counsel for David Mac Kelly appeared and actively cro: 
examined the witnesses. In the case of Utah Highway Patrolman D.1i. 
Tinning, various counsel for David Mac Kelly were properly notified~ 
advised of the deposition, but failed to appear. Documentary evidenci 
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also introduced and considered by the court. Frank Keith Stuart, a 
certified public accountant and financial consultant, Mrs. Herman Foster 
and Mr. John Ewing personally testified at the trial. 
The law requires that matters of fraud or collusion be proven 
by clear and convincing evidence. See: Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. 
v. Sohm, 391 P. 2d 293 (Utah, 1964). All of the defendant's evidence 
of fraud, collusion or bad faith was before the court when plaintiffs' 
!\lotion for Summary Judgment was granted. Even assuming that defen-
dant' s claims were true, and construing all of the other evidence in its 
favor, Salt Lake County would not have been entitled to prevail. When 
such is the case, summary judgment is proper. See: Uliberry v. 
Christensen, 275 P. 2d 170 (Utah, 1954). Other jurisdictions, in the 
cases of Metcalf v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., supra., Coblentz 
v. American Surety Co. of New York, supra., and Taylor v. Safeco Ins. 
Co., supra., upheld similar judgments under similar fact situations. 
This is especially true where Salt Lake County seeks equity but 
does not approach the court with clean hands having unreasonably refused 
to defend David Mac Kelly. 
POINT IV 
SALT LAKE COUNTY IS LIABLE TO DAVID 
MAC KELLY FOR THE JUDGMENT UNDER ITS 
POLICY OF SELF INSURANCE. 
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It has already been established that Utah is a compulsory autot 
bile no-fault and liability state. The question now is whether David ~h 
Kelly was covered under the liability policy. Admittedly, the judgmen'. 
is of no consequence to Salt Lake County if its claim of non-liability is 
correct. However, David Mac Kelly was covered under the policy ifh;l 
a permissive user of the Salt Lake County motor vehicle at the timeol 
the accident. The lower court held that he was. We agree for the 
following reasons: First. it is undisputed that David Mac Kelly wasdi:J 
a Salt Lake County vehicle at the time of the fatal accident; Second, 
David Mac Kelly had been assigned that motor vehicle on a permanent 
basis, seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day; Third, according 
to Sheriffs Delmar L. Larson and Rex L. Vance, a deputy sheriff is a 
deputy sheriff twenty-four hours a day. In his deposition, Sheriff LaF 
stated in part: 
"A. Well, I am aware of another case in the office where 
a deputy was involved. He wasn't on official business, but 
a deputy sheriff in my opinion is a deputy sheriff 24 hours. 
While he was in a tavern there was a felony that occurred 
and he took some action. He solved it. Did a good job. 
The County Attorney at first refused to represent him 
because he stated he was not on duty. I objected. I wrote 
a letter to the County Attorney and pointed out that a deputy 
sheriff is a deputy sheriff 24 hours a day, and in view of 
that letter, the County Attorney's office did represent him. 
Now this was another officer." Larson Dep. at P. 16. 
In his deposition, Sheriff Vance stated in part: 
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Q: And specifically, as to Deputy Sheriff Kelly, were 
you acquainted with him? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And knew that he was assigned to the Warrant 
Division at the time of this accident we are 
talking about? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that as Sheriff Larson has described, he would 
have occasion at various times of the day and night, 
considerably in the night because of the nature of 
his task, to use his vehicle? 
A: This is true. 
Q: And in that connection it would then be appropriate 
for him to drive it to his home? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that was his practice as far as you know? 
A: As far as I know, yes. 
Q: And as Sheriff Larson has said in his view, 
Sheriff, a deput sheriff is a deputy sheriff 24 
hours a day. Would you second that sentiment? 
A: Absolutely. 
Vance Dep. at P. 4 
Further, at the time of the accident, David Mac Kelly had bench warrants 
to be served in his possession in his car, Fourth, defendant claims 
that at the time of the accident, David Mac Kelly had been drinking and 
it was against County policy to drink and drive. However, the uncontro-
verted evidence was that Salt Lake County knew of David Mac Kelly's 
propensity to drink and drive County motor vehicles. yet persisted in 
assigning him one on a permanent basis, seven days a week, twenty-four 
hours a day. Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 4 in the case of Mrs. Herman Foster 
and John Ewing v. David Mac Kelly, C 78-1377 shows that on May 9, 
1976, David Mac Kelly was stopped by Trooper Wayne Smith for driving 
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under the influence, and on December 16, 1976, he was stopped again: 
University of Utah police officer, George Foss, for driving under the 
influence. 
In short, for purposes of automobile liability policies, David ll: 
Kelly was a permissive user of a Salt Lake County motor vehicle at thi 
time of the accident. 
Defendant claims that even if there is coverage it is not liablt 
under the policy because it is required to make payment only if the 
insured would be legally obligated to pay. Defendant cites the case of 
Huffman v. Peerless Ins. Co., 193 S. E. 2d 773 (N. C. 1973) in support 
of that proposition. That case is, in fact, an aberration. 
The general rule is that the liability of an insurer is absolute 
upon the happening of a loss, and that the liability of the insurer is not 
dependent upon the recovery of a judgment against the insured, or the 
making of any payment to the injured person. See: Couch on Insuranc: 
2nd, 45: 24, Liability of Insurer Under Liability Contract; Viddish v. 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 41 N. J. Super 221, 124 A. 2d 6~: 
(1956); Boney v. Central M. Ins. Co., 213 N. C. 470, 196 S. E. 83711: 
Michel v. American F&C Co., 82 F. 2d 583 (CA5 Fla. 1936); ~ 
Indemnity Co. v. Knott, 114 Fla. 820, 153 So. 304 (1934), Ziemanv. 
United States F. & Guar. Co., 214 Iowa 468, 238 N. Vv'. 100 (1931l: ~ 
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v. Allstate Ins. Co., 147 S. W. 2d 182 (Mo. App. 1941); Miller v. United 
States Casualty Co., 137 Misc. 252, 241 NYS 753 (1930); Associated 
Indemnity Corp. v. McAlexander, 168 Tenn. 424, 79 S. W. 2d 556 (1935); 
and Fentress v. Rutledge, 140 Va. 685, 125 S. E. 668 (1924). More 
specifically, the cases of Metcalf v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Co., supra., Coblentz v. American Surety Company of New York, supra., 
and Taylor v. Safeco Ins. Co., supra., held that with similar stipulations 
and agreements, to wit: that the plaintiff would only look to insurance 
proceeds to satisfy the judgment against the defendant, the plaintiffs 
could, in fact, recover from the liability insurance carriers. 
The rationale is best stated in a short excerpt from the case of 
Richichi v. City of Chicago, 49 Ill. App. 320, 199 N. E. 2d 652 (1964): 
If it were held that the City would have to pay only 
such amount of the judgment as the policeman could 
afford to pay to the injured party, this would create 
a circuitry of action and the purpose of the statute 
would be defeated. In the present case all the con-
ditions of the City's liability have been established, 
i.e., the policeman was engaged in the performance 
of his duties and was not guilty of willful misconduct. 
The plaintiff has obtained a judgment against the 
policeman for $40, 000. 00 and since December 4, 1958, 
the date of entry of the final judgment, has only been 
able to recover $1. 01. If the City only had to 
reimburse Bielski for this $1, 01, Bielski would have 
another $1. 01 which Richichi could obtain. Bielski 
could again turn to the City for repaymrot of this $1. 01, 
and so on until the $40, 000. 00 was paid in dribbles 
of $1. O 1. Back and forth this could continue, perhaps 
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in a never-ending cycle if interest continued 
to accumulate (interest has already accrued for 
almost $9, 000. 00). The result would be that 
the judgment would continue to hang over 
Bielski's head, and the purpose of the statute 
would be defeated. At 658. [Emphasis added) 
Similarly, if Salt Lake County, as an insurance carrier, only had to pa; 
as much of the judgment as David Mac Kelly could afford to pay, it wou: 
defeat the purpose of insurance and the judgment would continue to han1 
over David Mac Kelly's head. Salt Lake County, the insurer, has a due 
to pay the judgment against David Mac Kelly, the insured. 
Finally, because Salt Lake County chose, by failing to express!; 
state otherwise, to have unlimited liability under its plan of self-insur< 
or in the alternative to have limits of liability equivalent to those oflt: 
last commercial liability insurance policy, plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover the entire judgment from Salt Lake County. The prayer for re: 
asked for damages in the sum of $100, 000. 00 plus such other and fur&.i: 
i 
relief as the court deemed proper. In the case of Dairyland Ins. Co. v.I 
Richards, 108 Ariz. 89, 492 P. 2d 1196 (1972) the insurance company 
claimed a judgment could not be enforced because the judgment was dii·I 
ferent in kind or exceeded the amount prayed for. The Supreme Couri' 
Arizona held: 
The exact language of the prayer of the complaint 
was "in a sum which is reasonable and just. 11 This 
is a sum indefinite in amount and defendants were 
compelled to assume that a judgment might be ultimately 
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entered in some amount. We must also assume 
that the court in the Richardses' case found that 
$22, 500 was reasonable and just in light of the 
evidence introduced. Here, again, Dairyland is 
foreclosed from attacking the judgment. A judg-
ment is conclusive as to damages. Manning v. 
State Farm Mutual, D. C., 235 F. Supp. 615; 
Wilhide v. Keystone Insurance Company, D. C., 
195 F. Supp. 659; Lamb v. Belt Casualty Com-
pany, 3 Cal App. 2d 624, 40 P. 2d 311. At 1198. 
[Emphasis added] 
Plaintiffs' recovery should not be limited to $100, 000. 00. 
POINT V 
THIS IS NOT A CASE OF INDEMl\IFICATION 
BUT ONE OF INSURANCE. 
This is an action on an insurance contract. Suit is not brought 
against Salt Lake County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-7 (1953 
as amended) (i.e., suit against a county employee for injuries caused 
by the employee's negligence while acting in the scope of his employment); 
nor is it a suit under the Indemnification of Public Officers and Employees' 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-48-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). 
If the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1 et 
seq. (1953 as amended)applies to this case at all, then §63-30-5 says 
that Salt Lake County can be sued on a contractual obligation and that 
the usual notice requirements don't apply. 
Accordingly, this action is not barred by the Governmental lmmu-
nity Act and the Indemnification of Public Officers and Employee's Act 
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is irrelevant. This is an action on an insurance contract. Plaintiffs 
could just as well be suing Aetna, Allstate, United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty, or State Farm. Salt Lake County has never understood or 
accepted that fact. That is the root of the problem. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court was correct in holding: 
1. That automobile no-fault and automobile liability insurance 
coverages are compulsory in Utah; that Salt Lake County by filing a 
Certificate of Self Insurance obligated itself to provide both coverages; 
and like any commercial automobile liability carrier, Salt Lake Count' 
owed a "duty to defend" and a "duty to pay" to its insured. 
2. That David Mac Kelly was an insured under the County's 
liability policy. 
3. That, in the alternative, if the County had no liability cover 
available, that it had no immunity from liability. 
4. That because Salt Lake County unreasonably refused to defe 
David Mac Kelly, it was bound by the judgment entered against hiri, in 
every particular, absent collusion or fraud. 
5. That the judgment was not based on fraud or collusion. 
6. That this is a case of insurance, not indemnification. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the lower court's judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this / 5-fh day of January, 1980. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
~-i 
!_/~~~ /////''~~/ 
Carman E. Kipp 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Mailed two copies each of the foregoing Brief of Respondents to 
Ted Cannon, Salt Lake County Attorney, and Merlin Lybbert and 
Scott Daniels of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
appellant, 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, 
postage prepaid, this (.-Jff; day of January, 1980. 
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